A n integral part of the practice of intensive care medicine involves imparting information to family and carers, and informing them of significant developments and possible outcomes. This is made all the more challenging when patients present or deteriorate acutely with an uncertain diagnosis and prognosis. Sometimes bad news may need to be given with little notice, in the middle of the night, and not always in The law does not impose a duty of care on a doctor with regard to a patient' s family, partner, carers or friends. Furthermore, there is no professional standard against which to be judged and the General Medical Council (GMC) has provided no guidance on this matter. If the GMC were to issue guidance on the standard to be expected of a doctor when talking to relatives then it would probably be no more than: "give information… in a considerate way" which can be found at paragraph 18.b of the GMC guidance 'Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together'. 1 Without a duty or standard of care, there can be no legal basis for a claim for psychiatric injury (especially if the claim is for a lack of provision of information) but this is not the end of the matter, as in certain circumstances it is possible for a claim to succeed.
When considering psychiatric injury or nervous 'shock' (the legal term) victims are divided into two categories, primary victims and secondary victims. Primary victims are those directly involved in the accident or incident, while secondary victims are those who see or learn of others being killed or injured. Psychiatric injury is often ahead of damage in clinical negligence cases where the patient, the primary victim, suffers psychiatric injury as a consequence of the physical injury. What I will consider here is 'pure' psychiatric injury (ie no physical injury) caused to a secondary victim ie the person with close ties of love and affection to the patient (the relative, partner or carer). It may surprise doctors to know that the courts have tried to limit the scope of claims for psychiatric injury by having a number of control mechanisms or hurdles which need to be overcome in order for a claim to succeed: • The claimant must have suffered from a recognisable psychiatric injury, ie more than bereavement, fear, anxiety or distress.
• The circumstances were such that the psychiatric injury was foreseeable.
• There must be a close tie of love and affection between the secondary victim and the injured person.
• The claimant must satisfy the test of temporal and special proximity, ie show the claimant was sufficiently close in time and space to events that are alleged to have caused the injury.
• The secondary victim' s psychiatric injury must have been caused by direct perception (ie through his or her own unaided senses) of the accident or its immediate aftermath. The illness must be induced by 'shock.' • Secondary victims can recover only if their psychiatric injuries were foreseeable in a person of 'ordinary fortitude.' The most common claim arises when a secondary victim has sustained a psychiatric injury (depression, post-traumatic stress disorder) after witnessing some horrific event where someone close to them has been injured or killed as a consequence of a negligent act by another. What if a close relative suffers psychiatric injury through witnessing the suffering or death of a loved one, the injury being a consequence of medical negligence? In principle there is no difference between claims for shock due to horrific scenes at the hospital after a road traffic accident and the same after a medical accident. However, the difficulty with the medical accident context is that horrific scenes are less likely. It is also important to remember that one cannot claim merely for the psychiatric injury caused by the death of a loved one; the claim is for 'shock.' The case law is somewhat inconsistent on what constitutes shock in the clinical negligence context, but none of the published cases turn on what was said by doctors to the secondary victim.
There have been a few cases which have tried to widen the categories of claims for which damages may be awarded for psychiatric harm. In the following two cases the claimants argued that the health authority was under a duty to disclose information in a sensitive/appropriate manner. In AB v Tameside and Glossop HA, a large number of patients received treatment from a person who was later found to be HIV positive. 2 As there was a small risk that some of them may have been infected, the defendant health authority wrote to the patients informing them of this fact and recommended that they undergo HIV testing if they were concerned. A telephone counselling line was also set up, but this was not operational until the letters went out. Although there was no evidence that any of the patients had been infected, a number of patients alleged that the letter was not drafted in a suitably sensitive manner and, further, it ought not to have been sent out until the help-line was operational. They contended that they had suffered psychiatric harm as a result of the defendant' s negligence. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant could not be held negligent merely because, in hindsight, it did not choose the best method of informing the claimants. Unfortunately, the court failed to answer the question of whether the defendant owed a legal duty to take care in releasing the information in the first place.
In Allin v City and Hackney HA 3 the claimant had
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undergone a very difficult labour and was then misinformed that her baby was dead. Six hours later, she discovered that her baby was still alive. The claimant' s claim for psychiatric harm caused as a result of the defendant' s careless dissemination of information succeeded; the defendant' s counsel conceded that the 'defendants were under a duty of care in respect of statements of this sort made to the mother.' It should be noted that following Allin, a woman given the correct news that her baby was dead as the result of clinical negligence would not be allowed to recover, but a woman given incorrect news would.
It is important to distinguish the above two cases from those of secondary victims claiming for psychiatric injury as a consequence of clinical negligence as the claimants in both cases were patients and hence a duty of care was owed to them; they were claiming as primary victims.
It is not uncommon to hear the criticism that the patient body has now become a group of acquisitive compensation seekers, ready, with enthusiastic lawyers to litigate at the drop of a hat. This is misconceived and not supported by statistics for the NHS Litigation Authority. However, in the context of proposed psychiatric injury claims there may be some truth in it. One can easily get the impression that as soon as any health body makes an insensitive move or fails to treat patients with consideration, the cry for compensation is heard, a lawyer arises to represent the aggrieved, and other members of the family, and litigation is threatened, often with little regard to the legal basis for a claim. The Alder Hey body organs scandal is an example of this. 4 Unfortunately, there now is a worrying trend of settling some unmeritorious claims to avoid negative publicity.
In order to bring a claim, the relative will need the report of a psychiatrist supporting the allegation that the psychiatric injury was sustained as a result of witnessing the events or being involved in the immediate aftermath. It is somewhat surprising that in the case referred to by Bodenham and Bell an intensive care consultant was instructed by the claimant' s solicitor before a psychiatrist. What is even more surprising is that the instruction was accepted, and an opinion forthcoming on the standard of care, breach of duty and causation. Doctors acting as expert witnesses should be fully conversant with all the duties and obligations of such a role. There are a number of expert witness societies and organisations and the GMC has recently issued its guidance 'Acting as an expert witness'. [5] [6] [7] [8] The GMC guidance expands on the principles of Good Medical Practice, 9 and clarifies how doctors should behave when giving expert evidence in court or tribunal cases. The guidance emphasises that medical expert witnesses must:
• Recognise their overriding duty to the court and to the administration of justice.
• Give opinion evidence within the limits of their professional competence.
• Keep up-to-date in their specialist area of practice.
• Explain when there is a range of views.
• Ensure that any change of view on a material matter is disclosed without delay.
• Disclose any conflicts of interest.
• Protect confidential information.
Experienced expert witnesses will recognise that there is nothing new in the guidance as it is based on the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and relevant case law. 10 While an expert may be criticised by the court if he deviates from the duty that he owes to it, an expert currently enjoys immunity from civil suit in respect of any work that "is so intimately connected with the conduct of the case in court." The immunity extends to:
• the preparation of the expert' s report for use at trial • discussions with experts for the purposes of CPR part 35.12 • the expert' s oral evidence at trial.
Immunity from suit does not extend to work done at the very early investigative stage of a claim or defence which does not form part of the expert' s involvement in the proceedings. Further, immunity from suit will not protect an expert from prosecution for perjury, contempt of court or perverting the course of justice. Immunity from suit exists for policy reasons and to enable experts to give evidence 'freely and fearlessly' and to avoid multiplicity of actions in which the value or truth of an expert' s evidence would be tried over again.
The purpose of the new GMC guidance is to clarify a doctor' s responsibilities when acting as an expert witness. It does not change the circumstances in which the GMC can investigate a doctor' s conduct or take action on registration. The GMC has an obligation to consider all concerns about a doctor that are brought to its attention but can only act where there is evidence that a doctor may not be fit to practise or a warning may be required. There is nothing to stop any person making a complaint to the GMC about a doctor acting as an expert witness, in the same way as they can in relation to concerns about any doctor' s conduct or performance.
Doctors should be reassured that ordinarily there is no basis for litigation based on an infelicitous comment or being deemed to have an insensitive or inappropriate manner by a family member, partner or carer. Keeping a good medical record of conversations and having a third party present are important safeguards should any complaint be made. Doctors should be under no illusion that when trust solicitors are faced with the competing interests of defending doctors or avoiding negative publicity, the latter may take precedence.
